We study the computational complexity of computing Nash equilibria in generalized interdependent-security (IDS) games. Like traditional IDS games, originally introduced by economists and risk-assessment experts Heal and Kunreuther about a decade ago, generalized IDS games model agents’ voluntary investment decisions when facing potential direct risk and transfer-risk exposure from other agents....

The ESP game belongs to the genre called Games with a Purpose (GWAP), which leverage people’s desire to be entertained and also outsource certain steps of the computational process to humans. The games have shown promise in solving a variety of problems, which computer computation has been unable to resolve completely thus far. In this study, we consider generalized ESP games with two objective...

We show that projected-gradient methods for the distributed computation of generalized Nash equilibria in aggregative games are preconditioned forward-backward splitting methods applied to the KKT operator of the game. Specifically, we adopt the preconditioned forward-backward design, recently conceived by Yi and Pavel in the manuscript “A distributed primal-dual algorithm for computation of ge...

We consider games where the winning conditions are disjunctions (or dually, conjunctions) of parity conditions; we call them generalized parity games. These winning conditions, while ω-regular, arise naturally when considering fair simulation between parity automata, secure equilibria for parity conditions, and determinization of Rabin automata. We show that these games retain the computational...

Recently, much attention has been devoted to discrete preference games to model the formation of opinions in social networks. More specifically, these games model the agents’ strategic decision of expressing publicly an opinion, which is a result of an interplay between the agent’s private belief and the social pressure. However, these games have very limited expressive power; they can model on...

It is known that the generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a quasivariational inequality. Our aim in this work to introduce variational approach study existence of solutions for ordinal games, is, games where player preferences are binary relations do not necessarily admit utility representation.