Real-time hardware Trojan detection by monitoring voltage and current consumption using on-chip sensors is shown to be a feasible way to secure critical integrated circuit (IC) applications. This paper investigates the distribution and optimization of on-chip sensors for real-time hardware Trojan detection and localization based on the characteristics of on-chip power distribution network. On-c...

This paper focuses on the behavior of Trojan horses in mobile devices. This malicious software tries to steal information from a mobile device while the user is unaware. We describe the communication links through a Trojan horse installed into a mobile device. To demonstrate the effects of a Trojan horse infection we present a practical example on a PDA. Via SMS, the malicious user can access a...

This paper addresses the Hardware Trojan issues in passive EPC C1G2 RFID Tags. We propose in this paper to study the insertion of malicious circuit in EPC GEN2 RFID tags. The description and the implementation of several different Hardware Trojans are first discussed. Then they are all evaluated in an EPC GEN2 environment using a dedicated FPGA based tag emulator. The evaluation focuses on crit...

To what extent should one trust a statement that program is free of Trojan horses? Perhaps it more important to the people who wrote software. . You can’t code you did not totally create yourself.

It is not possible to view a computer operating in the real world, including the possibility of Trojan Horse programs and computer viruses, as simply a finite realisation of a Turing Machine. We consider the actions of Trojan Horses and viruses in real computer systems and suggest a minimal framework for an adequate formal understanding of the phenomena. Some conventional approaches, including ...

A Hardware Trojan is a malicious, undesired, intentional modification of an electronic circuit or design, resulting in the incorrect behaviour of an electronic device when in operation – a back-door that can be inserted into hardware. A Hardware Trojan may be able to defeat any and all security mechanisms (software or hardware-based) and subvert or augment the normal operation of an infected de...

We infiltrate the ASIC development chain by inserting a small denial-of-service (DoS) hardware Trojan at the fabrication design phase into an existing VLSI circuit, thereby simulating an adversary at a semiconductor foundry. Both the genuine and the altered ASICs have been fabricated using a 180 nm CMOS process. The Trojan circuit adds an overhead of only 0.5 % to the original design. In order ...