A contribution to a special issue on Hormones and Human Competition.Testosterone is theorized to influence status-seeking behaviors such as social dominance and competitive behavior, but supporting evidence is mixed. The present study tested the roles of testosterone and cortisol in the hawk-dove game, a dyadic economic decision-making paradigm in which earnings depend on one's own and the othe...

Game theory has been useful for understanding risk-taking and cooperative behavior. In the present study, subjects played the Hawk-Dove game with simulated and embodied (robotic) neural agents which used a neurobiologically plausible model of action selection and adaptive behaviors. Subjects had their serotonin levels temporarily altered through acute tryptophan depletion (ATD). The traditional...

Hawk-Dove is an interesting and important game of evolutionary biology. We consider the game from point of view of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs). In the classical version of the game only a mixed ESS exists.We find a quantum version of this game where both pure and mixed ESSs can exist.

In this paper we study one of the most well known examples of evolutionary games, the Hawk and Dove problem, in the dynamic framework of Markov Decision Evolutionary Games. We associate with each player an extra individual state depending on the age and on the strength of the individual. This state may change as a function of the actions taken by those it encounters. The goal of a player is to ...

This introduction provides the reader with a basic knowledge about the fascinating field of evolutionary game theory. After presenting the mathematical notion of games, the two probably most important approaches to analyze a game are discussed. Each new concept is briefly discussed theoretically and than applied to the Hawk-Dove-Game.

Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These findings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionar...