It has long been recognized that we have a great deal of freedom to imagine what choose. This paper explores thesis—what call “intentionalism (about the imagination)”—that provides way making this evident (if vague) truism precise. According intentionalism, contents your imaginings are simply determined by whatever you intend imagine. Thus, for example, when visualize building and it be King’s ...

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The contemporary discussion on the subjective character of conscious experience is characterized by a stark contrast between higher-order intentionalism, according to which any state awareness depends instantiation intentional properties mental states, and anti-intentionalism, inner constitutive fundamentally different from ordinary instances external or introspective awareness, in that one’s n...

Are the properties of communicative acts grounded in the intentions with which they are performed, or in the conventions that govern them? The latest round in this debate has been sparked by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone (2015), who argue that much more of communication is conventional than we thought, and that the rest isn’t really communication after all, but merely the initiation of open-en...