Principal Investigators: Jean-Michel DeVink, University of Saskatchewan, 115 Perimeter Rd, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 0X4, [email protected] Dr. Stuart Slattery, Ducks Unlimited Canada, Institute for Wetland and Waterfowl Research, Box 1160, Stonewall, Manitoba, R0C 2Z0, [email protected] Dr. Bob Clark, Canadian Wildlife Service, 115 Perimeter Rd, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 0X4,...

This paper analyzes the effects of a potential spillover on technology transfer of a multinational enterprise and on the host country policy. In particular, we examine how both parties’ incentives can be controlled through the ownership structure in an international joint venture. In contrast to existing arguments we show that spillovers must not always have negative effects on technology trans...

It is often argued that multinationals are reluctant to transfer technology due to the fear of spillovers. We show that this need not be the case if host country policies like taxation are taken into account. Furthermore, we examine the incentives the multinational and the host country have to engage in an international joint venture. We show why a multinational may agree to enter a joint ventu...

The paper analyzes optimal governance structures for the provision of a common input. Monitoring by the future users of the input may improve its quality. Monitoring has a public good component in that it benefits all users, as well as a conflict of interest component in that a monitor may use her proprietary information to bias input choice to her benefit and to the detriment of the other user...