A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive.1 This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth A...

the paper deals with kant's conception of moral judgment. i start by criticizing a dominant interpretation of kant's practical rationality in its assertion that choosing, i.e. exercising judgment consists in adopting a maxim; and adopting a maxim is equivalent to acting on a principle, giving oneself the moral law (korsgaard). according to this view, the logical inescapability of choo...

Over the last 20 years, a number of central figures in moral philosophy have defended some version of moral rationalism, the idea that morality is based on reason or rationality (e.g., Gewirth 1978, Darwall 1983, Nagel 1970, 1986, Korsgaard 1986, Singer 1995; Smith 1994, 1997). According to rationalism, morality is based on reason or rationality rather than the emotions or cultural idiosyncrasi...

Andersen, H. R., Andersson, A.-M., Arnold, S. F., Autrup, H., Barfoed, M., Beresford, N. A., Bjerregaard, P., Christiansen, L. B., Gissel, B., Hummel, R., Jørgensen, E. B., Korsgaard, B., Le Guevel, R., Leffers, H., McLachlan, J., Møller, A., Nielsen, J. B., Olea, N., Oles-Karasko, A., Pakdel, F., Pederson, K. L., Perez, P., Skakkeboek, N. E., Sonnenschein, C., Soto, A. M., Sumpter, J. P., Thor...

Over the past two decades it has become standard to construe Kant’s ethics as a paradigm of constructivism, standing in stark opposition to realism. Under such an interpretation, Kant’s ethics is based on constructive procedures that yield normative practical principles for us, rather than on facts about goodness that might ground such principles. While there is, no doubt, textual support for t...

In this discussion note, I aim to reconstruct and assess Korsgaard's recent attempt extend her regress argument. begin, in section 1, with a brief recapitulation of the Then, 2, turn extension. argue that extension does not work because Korsgaard cannot rule out possibility--a possibility for which there is both empirical evidence argumentative pressure coming directly from original regress--th...

Abstract In Fellow Creatures , Christine Korsgaard claims that human beings ought to treat all sentient animals as ends in themselves. However, this article, I argue Korgaard's method goes beyond what a coherent constructivist conception allows, and claim we should therefore adopt Humean rather than Kantian version of constructivism. believe such permits us hold substantial ethical positions ab...

Abstract This chapter discusses the relation between non-human animals and Kant’s ‘Formula of Humanity’, which asks us to treat humanity as an end in itself, not a mere means. The difficulties reading formula substantive principle about who deserves moral concern. views Wood Korsgaard are discussed this context. points out different interpretation on it expresses feature autonomous willing rath...