We examine a problem of demand for insurance indemnification, when the insured is sensitive to ambiguity and behaves according maxmin expected utility model Gilboa Schmeidler (J. Math. Econ. 18:141–153, 1989), whereas insurer (risk-averse or risk-neutral) expected-utility maximiser. characterise optimal indemnity functions both with without customary ex ante no-sabotage requirement on feasible ...

The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team of rational players sharing the same goal and without the capability of correlating their strategies in strategic games against an adversary. This solution concept can capture situations in which an agent controls multiple resources—corresponding to the team members—that cannot communicate. It is known that such equilibriu...

Chateauneuf and Faro [3] axiomatize a weighted version of maxmin expected utility over acts with nonnegative utilities, where weights are represented by a confidence function. We argue that their representation is only one of many possible, and we axiomatize a more natural form of maxmin weighted expected utility. We also provide stronger uniqueness results.

We study a two-person zero-sum game where players simultaneously choose sequences of actions, and the overall payoff is the average of a one-shot payoff over the joint sequence. We consider the maxmin value of the game played in pure strategies by boundedly rational players and model bounded rationality by introducing complexity limitations. First we define the complexity of a sequence by its s...

The Ellsberg Paradox demonstrates that many people like to hedge ambiguity in a way that contradicts expected utility maximization. We postulate roughly that all violations of the expected utility theory are due to affinity for ambiguity hedging. The associated utility representation is a special case of maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), where the set of priors Π has a well...

In discrete search and optimization problems where the elements that may or not be included in a solution correspond to humans, individual fairness needs to be expressed in terms of each individual’s satisfaction probability (the probability of being included in the solution). In this paper we introduce the maxmin fairness frameworkwhich provides, on any given input instance, the strongest guar...