We consider sequential competition among sellers, with different consumers desiring the good at different times. Each consumer has the option of buying from a later seller. Each seller recognizes that future sellers are potential competitors. We find that if sellers do not know the previous history of sales, then an equilibrium price is necessarily the same as that which would be set by a simpl...

We study the efficiency of allocations in large markets with a network structure where every seller owns an edge in a graph and every buyer desires a path connecting some nodes. While it is known that stable allocations can be very inefficient, the exact properties of equilibria in markets with multiple sellers are not fully understood, even in singlesource single-sink networks. In this work, w...

I construct an endogenous growth model where R&D is carried out at the industry level in a game of innovation between leaders and followers. Innovation costs for followers are assumed to increase with the technological lag from leaders. I obtain three results that contrast with standard Schumpeterian models, such as Aghion and Howitt (1992). First, leaders may innovate in equilibrium, in an att...

The prevailing paradigm of medieval manufacturing presumes guilds monopolized markets for durable goods in late-medieval England. The sources of the monopolies are said to have been the charters of towns, charters of guilds, parliamentary statutes, and judicial precedents. This essay examines those sources, demonstrates they did not give guilds legal monopolies in the modern sense of the word, ...