This paper investigates the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic institutions. We model institutions as fixed costs of entry, in a framework that has two key features. First, preferences over entry costs differ across firms and depend on firm size. Larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry, in order to reduce competition. Second, these costs are endogenous...

Article history: Received 21 June 2009 Received in revised form 6 April 2010 Accepted 27 June 2010 Available online 29 July 2010 Rational choice models predict that political competition and political participation have opposite effects on the size of government. We investigate these theories using data from a panel of 18 Latin American countries during the 20th century. Our research builds evi...

We have developed an algorithm called Q5 for probabilistic classification of healthy versus disease whole serum samples using mass spectrometry. The algorithm employs principal components analysis (PCA) followed by linear discriminant analysis (LDA) on whole spectrum surface-enhanced laser desorption/ionization time of flight (SELDI-TOF) mass spectrometry (MS) data and is demonstrated on four r...

Three main changes in thinking about poverty have gained increasing currency over the past decade. First, the concept of poverty has broadened, with increasing attention to issues of vulnerability, inequality and human rights. Second, the causal structure has broadened to include causal variables, such as social, political, cultural, coercive and environmental capital. Third, the causal structu...

We study the optimal emission standards under uncertain pollution damages and transaction costs associated with policy changes in a dynamic setting. We consider three alternative forms of transactions costs and show that they can lead to different kinds of delays of policy changes or smaller scales of these changes. Thus, policy persistence can be a rational response of forward-looking policy m...

We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that this phenomenon is more likely to occur i...

This short paper analyzes whether a federal transfer system can be designed to increase welfare, when state governments create political budget cycles to increase the likelihood of reelection. The results show how the federal government may announce a transfer scheme in advance for the post-election year that counteracts the welfare costs of political budget cycles. JEL Classification: D61, D72...

This paper analyses the role of political connections in the post-entry performance of private start-up companies in China. It documents robust evidence that political affiliation enhances firms’ survival and growth prospects, even if politically neutral start-ups enjoy faster productivity improvements. In addition, the benefits of political connections are largely confined to firms associated ...

In this paper I develop a model of political platform choice and subsequent policy implementation decisions by political candidates who are primarily motivated by career concerns. Although political platforms are non binding, politicians have some incentive to keep campaign promises in order to uphold their reputation. I analyze the electoral outcome and the determinants which influence the dec...