This paper defends a neo-Aristotelian conception of practical wisdom as virtue that enables human agents to reflect on and direct their lives toward virtuous ends over time. view is sometimes assumed require commitment an intellectualist Grand End or blueprint view. On view, would philosophical insight implausibly well worked out set weighted preferences. In this paper, I aim show particularist...

contemporary philosophy is replete with various theories about rationality; however, the general concept of rationality is ambiguous. through exploring into the renowned schools of epistemology and philosophy of science, richard foley finds out the purpose and perspective to be constant elements in all theories of rationality. the purpose is the entity needed or desired by the individual and ca...

Recent work in the Everett interpretation has suggested that the problem of probability can be solved by understanding probability in terms of rationality. However, there are two problems relating to probability in Everett — one practical, the other epistemic — and the rationality-based program directly addresses only the practical problem. One might therefore worry that the problem of probabil...

The strategy of this paper is to throw light on rational cognition and epistemic justification by examining irrationality. Epistemic irrationality is possible because we are reflexive cognizers, able to reason about and redirect some aspects of our own cognition. One consequence of this is that one cannot give a theory of epistemic rationality or epistemic justification without simultaneously g...

In this article, after reviewing the difference between fundamentalist and anti-fundamentalist philosophy, the features of the rationality will be explained from the perspective of five anti-fundamentalist philosophers (Habermas, Richard Rorty, MacIntyre, Michel Foucault and Hayek). The common point stated by all these philosophers is that they all criticize metaphysics and doubt about the basi...

In the first part of the paper (sec. 1-4), I argue that Elqayam and Evan's (2011) distinction between normative and instrumental conceptions of cognitive rationality corresponds to deontological vs. teleological accounts in meta-ethics. I suggest that Elqayam and Evans' distinction be replaced by the distinction between a-priori intuition-based vs. a-posteriori success-based accounts of cogniti...

This paper combines ideas from recent philosophical work on rational agency and work in artificial intelligence on hierarchical non-linear planners which combine plan generation, execution, and monitoring, to produce a planning theory of rational agency for resource-bounded agents.

Against the ideal of value-free science I argue that science is not––and cannot be––value-free and that relevant values are both cognitive and moral. I develop an argument by indicating various aspects of the value-ladenness of science. The recognition of the value-ladenness of science requires rethinking our understanding of the rationality and responsibility of science. Its rationality cannot...