Abstract In this paper, I discuss a view proposed by Carl Hempel in his paper Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets, published 1969. Here, suggested that questions regarding the identification of mental states with physiological states, relation between sociological phenomena individual behavioral biological physicochemical should be given what he calls ‘linguistic’ interpretation. His m...

This paper is an attempt to understand the content of, and motivation for, a popular form of physicalism, which I call ‘non-reductive physicalism’. Non-reductive physicalism claims although the mind is physical (in some sense), mental properties are nonetheless not identical to (or reducible to) physical properties. This suggests that mental properties are, in earlier terminology, ‘emergent pro...

Abstract I define two metaphysical positions that anti-physicalists can take in response to Jonathan Schaffer’s ground functionalism. Ground functionalism is a version of physicalism where explanatory gaps are everywhere. If true, arguments against based on the gap between physical and experiential facts fail. In response, first, argue some already safe from challenge. These reject an underlyin...

Modern conversations between the natural sciences and theology on the human soul have not so far engaged extensively with the debates of the early church on the matter. This article considers the relevance of the Apollinarian controversy (the fourth century Christological contention of whether or not Jesus has a human soul/mind), and suggests that this introduces important considerations for th...

Modern conversations between the natural sciences and theology on the human soul have not so far engaged extensively with the debates of the early church on the matter. This article considers the relevance of the Apollinarian controversy (the fourth century Christological contention of whether or not Jesus has a human soul/mind), and suggests that this introduces important considerations for th...

Among the arguments that have been proposed for physicalism, “causal argument” is widely taken to be most compelling. Justin Tiehen (2015) has raised an interesting objection this argument takes form of a dilemma. Tiehen’s ultimate conclusion at best, causal circular and so its premises cannot provide support conclusion, physicalism. The aim present paper respond in order defense argument.

I survey some of the connections between the metaphysics of the relation between mind and matter, and quantum theory’s measurement problem. After discussing the metaphysics, especially the correct formulation of physicalism, I argue that two state-reduction approaches to quantum theory’s measurement problem hold some surprises for philosophers’ discussions of physicalism. Though both approaches...