Eliminating middlemen from security protocols helps less than one would think. EMV electronic payments, for example, can be made fairer by adding an electronic attorney – a middleman which mediates access to a customer’s card. We compare middlemen in crypto protocols and APIs with those in the real world, and show that a manin-the-middle defence is helpful in many circumstances. We suggest that...

This paper provides replies to the objections Tony Roark presented (Roark, T. 2003. ‘Conceptual closure in Anselm’s proof’, History and Philosophy of Logic 24) to my reconstruction of Anselm’s famous argument in the Proslogion (Klima, G. 2000. ‘Saint Anselm’s Proof: A Problem of Reference, Intentional Identity and Mutual Understanding’, in G. Holmström-Hintikka, Medieval Philosophy and Modern T...

Man-in-the-middle attack is used wildly as a method of attacking the network. To discover how this type of attack works, this paper describes a method of man-in-the-middle attack based on ARP spoofing, and proposes a method of preventing such attacks.

In the domain of Genetic Deafness in medicine, it is important to detect some patterns. Medical doctors needs to search and deal with information from diverse sources and it is important to be able to cross information between sources. As part of a solution, one approach to minimize the impact of this lack and increase the success of the retrieval process crossing diverse sources of information...

Let π = π1π2 · · · πn be any permutation of length n, we say a descent πiπi+1 is a lower, middle, upper if there exists j > i + 1 such that πj < πi+1, πi+1 < πj < πi, πi < πj, respectively. Similarly, we say a rise πiπi+1 is a lower, middle, upper if there exists j > i + 1 such that πj < πi, πi < πj < πi+1, πi+1 < πj, respectively. In this paper we give an explicit formula for the generating fu...

Unconditionally secure authentication codes with arbitration (A 2-codes) protect against deceptions from the transmitter and the receiver as well as that from the opponent. In this paper, we present combinatorial lower bounds on the cheating probabilities and the sizes of keys of A 2-codes. Especially, our bounds for A 2-codes without secrecy are all tight for small size of source states.