This paper surveys some applications of cooperative game theory to supply chain management. Special emphasis is placed on two important aspects of cooperative games: profit allocation and stability. The paper first describes the construction of the set of feasible outcomes in commonly seen supply chain models, and then uses cooperative bargaining models to find allocations of the profit pie bet...

Wireless ad-hoc networks rely on the cooperation of participating nodes for almost all their functions. However, due to resource constraints, nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit when participating in the network. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which can be used as incentives to form coalitions inside the network. In this paper, we study coalition fo...

The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations: Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations The labor economics literature has shown that the “efficient bargaining” model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient “right-to-manage” model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subse...

In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the delay of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this configuration, clients cooperate with each other to recover the erased packets without a central controller. Game theory is employed herein as a tool for improving the d...

We study the equilibrium outcomes of two-person bargaining problems in which each party has “outside option” known only to himself. We examin two game forms, a sequential-move game and a simulteneous-move game. In this context we discuss the failure to reach agreements and the loss of efficiency thereof. Invoking the analogy between the sequentialmove game and the familiar ultimatum game we als...

In this research, we examine the influence of beliefs about fairness on bargaining behavior. Using a repeated ultimatum game, we examine bargaining contexts in Japan and the United States in which buyers’ or sellers’ fair beliefs are either in alignment with or in conflict with their own self-interest. We suggest that understanding the relationship between fair beliefs and self-interest is cent...

This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues such as the appropriate game form, existence and uniqueness of equilibria are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.

The core of an M-person game, though used already by von Neumann and Morgenstern [15], was first explicitly defined by Gillies [5]. Gillies's definition is restricted to cooperative games with side payments and unrestrictedly transferable utilities(2), but the basic idea is very simple and natural, and appears in many approaches to game theory. We consider a certain set of "outcomes" to a game,...

Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these models do not depend on the history of offers made during a negotiation. This paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing during the bargaining process as result of the counterparty’s offers.