In this research, we empirically investigate the payoff of aggressive bidding in an online auction. To address our research question, we use a unique and very rich dataset containing actual market transaction data for approximately 7,000 pay-per-bid auctions. Our research design allows us to isolate the impact of bidding aggressively in an attempt to signal a high valuation on the probability t...

In practice, the rules in most open English auctions require participants to raise bids by a sizeable, discrete amount. Furthermore, some bidders are typically more aggressive in seeking to become the “current bidder” during competitive bidding. Most auction theory, however, has assumedbidders can place any tiny “continuous” bid increase, and recommend as optimal the tiniest possible increase. ...

To be successful in multi-attribute auction, agents must be capable of adapting to continuous changing bidding price. This paper presents a novel fuzzy attitude based bidding strategy (FA-Bid), which employs dual assessment technique i.e. assessment of multiple attributes of the goods as well as assessment of agents attitude (eagerness) to procure an item in automated auction. The assessment of...

We experiment conditions for the emergence of trust in a multi-agent bidding setting using a computational approach. This is a follow up of our study on multi-agent bidding and contracting for non-storable goods. In this framework, there is a long-term contract market as well as a back-stop spot market. Seller agents bid into an electronic bulletin board their contract offers in terms of price ...

In this document I respond to three sections of Prof. Milgrom and Prof. Ausubel’s analysis in their Comments on the Second Wye River Package Bidding Conference. First I examine the expressivity of the auction #31 bidding language. Second I discuss some computational issues that arise from the choice of bidding language, concentrating on computational benefits of the OR-of-XOR language and on ho...

We model budget-constrained keyword bidding in sponsored search auctions as a stochastic multiple-choice knapsack problem (S-MCKP) and propose a new algorithm to solve SMCKP and the corresponding bidding optimization problem. Our algorithm selects items online based on a threshold function which can be built/updated using historical data. Our algorithm achieved about 99% performance compared to...

This paper investigates utility maximising bidding heuristics for agents that participate in multiple heterogeneous auctions, in which the auction format and the starting and closing times can be different. Our strategy allows an agent to procure one or more items and to participate in any number of auctions. For this case, forming an optimal bidding strategy by global utility maximisation is c...

The 2010 German 4G spectrum auction was an unusually large simultaneous ascending multi-band auction. The bidding was competitive and the final assignment was efficient. However, our analysis suggests that independent and rational bidders had an opportunity to coordinate implicitly on a lowrevenue outcome. Coordination was difficult, though, because of a multiplicity of focal points. One import...

Bidders in procurement auctions often face avoidable fixed costs. This can make bidding decisions complex and risky, and market outcomes volatile. If bidders deviate from risk neutral best responses, either due to faulty optimization or risk attitudes, then equilibrium predictions can perform poorly. In this paper, we confront laboratory bidders with three auction formats that make bidding diff...