A graph game proceeds as follows: two players move a token through to produce finite or infinite path, which determines the payoff of game. We study bidding games in each turn, an auction player moves token. Bidding were largely studied combination with variants first-price auctions called “Richman” and “poorman” bidding. taxman bidding, span spectrum between two. The is parameterized by consta...

We model a market in which suppliers bid step-function offer curves using agent-based modeling. Our model is an abstraction of electricity markets where step-function offer curves are given to an independent system operator that manages the auctions in electricity markets. Positing an elementary and computationally accessible learning model, Probe and Adjust, we present analytic results that ch...

This paper proposes a method for determining the price bidding strategies of market participants consisting of Generation Companies (GENCOs) and Distribution Companies (DISCOs) in a day-ahead electricity market, while taking into consideration the load forecast uncertainty and demand response programs. The proposed algorithm tries to find a Pareto optimal point for a risk neutral participan...

We identify a self-enforcing collusion protocol (a “bidding ring”) for non-repeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and Marx [2007], we allow for the existence of multiple cartels in the auction and do not assume that non-colluding agents have perfect knowledge about the number of colluding agents whose bids are sup...

Name-Your-Own-Price (NYOP) auctions have gained recent popularity on the Internet. In many NYOP settings, the auction firm displays multiple bidding items for the bidders (such as multiple options of airline tickets) and restricts them to place a single offer. Recent studies have, however, shown that the Internet environment enables many customers to engage in repeat bidding. Our purpose in thi...

This paper designs a novel fuzzy competition and attitude based bidding strategy (FCA-Bid), in which the final best bid is calculated on the basis of the attitude of the bidders and the competition for the goods in the market. The estimation of attitude is based on the bidding item’s attribute assessment, which adapts the fuzzy sets technique to handle uncertainty of the bidding process as well...

Recent measures to reduce Medicare spending include the use of competitive bidding in determining reimbursement prices. Several competitive bidding experiments have been conducted by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to determine reimbursement prices. This paper investigates the use of competitive bidding to set reimbursement prices for durable medical equipment, prosthetics,...

Interactive pricing mechanisms integrate customers into the price-setting process by letting them submit bids. Name-your-own-price auctions are such an interactive pricing mechanism, where buyers’ bids denote the final price of a product or service in case they surpass a secret threshold price set by the seller. If buyers are given the flexibility to bid repeatedly, they might try to incrementa...

Internet auctions have resulted in much data that may shed light on buying and selling behavior. Furthermore, they have allowed for field experiments to explore these phenomena with more control and with greater depth. Finally, they have revealed new behavioral patterns worthy of exploration. One of these behaviors is late bidding, or sniping, which occurs when people place bids close to the au...

We run a large field experiment with an online company specializing in selling used automobiles via ascending auctions. We manipulate experimentally the maximum amount which bidders can bid above the current standing price, thus affecting the ease with which bidders can engage in jump bidding. We test between the intimidation vs. costly bidding hypotheses of jump bidding by looking at the effec...