We analyze a market in which sellers compete for heterogeneous buyers by posting mechanisms. A general meeting technology governs how buyers and sellers meet. We introduce a one-to-one transformation of this meeting technology that helps to clarify and extend many of the existing results in the literature, which has focused on two special cases: urn-ball and bilateral meetings. We show that the...

A class of efficient mechanisms for allocating a divisible good is studied, which is more general than simple mechanisms discovered independently by Maheswaran and Başar and by us. Strategic buyers play a game by submitting one-dimensional bids, or signals, to the seller. The seller allocates the good in proportion to the bids and charges the buyers nonuniform prices according to the mechanism....

Buyers often search across multiple retailers or websites to learn which product best fits their needs. We study how sellers manage these search incentives through their disclosure policies (e.g. advertisements, product trials and reviews), and ask how competition affects information provision. If sellers can observe the beliefs of buyers (e.g. they can track buyers via their cookies) then, in ...

We explain why buyers in the housing market use an agent employed by the seller. Such agents reduce buyers' search costs so that more buyers search a particular house. This increases the probability of the sale of the house and possibly also its selling price. However, since the selling price increases, if at all, by less than the fee paid by the seller to the agent, both buyers and sellers are...

Along with the many needs of community for their lives, especially in motorized vehicles, financial institutions provide credit facilities to make it easier people who want own a motorbike near future but are constrained by costs. One that system is Honda. Honda has launched kinds products, one which Revo FI FIT. To attract buyers, provides various installment offers loan amounts and terms. The...

We present a revenue optimization algorithm for posted-price auctions when facing a buyer with random valuations who seeks to optimize his -discounted surplus. In order to analyze this problem we introduce the notion of ✏-strategic buyer, a more natural notion of strategic behavior than what has been considered in the past. We improve upon the previous state-of-the-art and achieve an optimal re...

Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power by Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium sized firms.

The paper studies equilibrium pricing in a product market for an indivisible good where buyers search for sellers. Buyers search sequentially for sellers, but do not meet every sellers with the same probability. Specifically, a fraction of the buyers’ meetings lead to one particular large seller, while the remaining meetings lead to one of a continuum of small sellers. In this environment, the ...

In this paper we give a constructive proof of existence of competitive equilibrium in two-sided matching markets. The same approach shows that the set of equilibrium prices is pathwise connected. We then extract from these results an algorithm for finding equilibria which can be further specified to compute the minimum price equilibrium that is optimal for all buyers individually. The two-sided...

Three experiments investigated the relations between buyers’ wealth or ability to pay (ATP) and sellers’ first offers. Study 1 demonstrated a positive correlation between sellers’ first offers and their perceptions of the buyer’s ATP as well as its real economic power (indicated by the company’s market value). In Study 2, sellers in a field experiment made higher offers to potential buyers of h...