When an informed party can engage in cheap talk with more than one audience, we show how the presence of one audience may either discipline or subvert the speaker's relationship with the other audience. We ask how welfare is affected by public or private disclosure, and predict how much communication will take place. Keyvt^ords. cheap talk, signaling, communication, incentives. Cheap Talk with ...

We consider a cheap talk game with a sender who has a reputational concern for an ability to predict a state of the world correctly, and where receivers may misunderstand the message sent. When communication between the sender and each receiver is private, we identify an equilibrium in which the sender only discloses the least noisy information. Hence, what determines the amount of information ...

W e augmentthe standard Crawford-Sobel(Econometrica 1 982) modelofcheap talkcommunication byallowingthe informed party tousebothcostlessandcostlymessages.Theissuesonwhichwefocus aretheconsequences forcheap talksignalingoftheoption tousea costlysignal(\ burnedmoney");thecircumstances underwhichboth cheap talkandburnedmoneyareusedtosignalinformation;andthe extenttowhichburningmoneyis thepreferred...

andor network-positions of themes and theme-relations. Schizophr. Indeed, ptions cultures do not have any corresponding emotion categories for some of the emotions.

This paper describes our experiments of using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to generate (counter-)facts from texts for certain namedentities. We give the human annotators a paragraph of text and a highlighted named-entity. They will write down several (counter-)facts about this named-entity in that context. The analysis of the results is performed by comparing the acquired data with the recognizing ...

Abstract In this chapter, we present an overview of the apparatus used in high energy physics. First, describe how particle collisions with are obtained, and then reaction is recorded as experimental data.

CheapTalk with Random Stopping is a Cheap-Talk game in which after each period of communication, with probability 1 >., the talk ends and the players play the original game (i.e, choose actions and receive payoffs). In this paper the relations between Cheap-Talk games and Cheap-Talk with Random Stopping are analyzed. -Institute of Mathematics and Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision ...

This paper shows that in some bargaining games, cheap talk must matter: the unique neologism-proof equilibrium involves informative talk. A simple tradeoff makes both equilibrium talk and neologisms credible: by saying that he is interested in trading, the buyer encourages the seller to continue to bargain but receives poorer terms of trade if trade occurs. All tj^pes of both parties are (weakl...

Why do political candidates who are largely office-motivated sometimes espouse views that are non-congruent with those of their electorate? Can non-congruent statements convey any information to voters about what a politician will do if elected, and if so, why would voters elect a politician who makes such statements? We develop a model of credible costless and non-binding communication in elec...