The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage and meet their energy needs. To this end, this paper develops a new model for electricity retail where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers. The model is based on simultaneous ...

Department of Business Administration, The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Champaign IL 61820, USA Operations and Information Management Department, School of Business, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269, USA Center for Research in Electronic Commerce, McCombs School of Business, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin TX 78712-1175, USA [email protected] • [email protected]...

This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for combinatorial auctions, we must consider the possibility of a ne...

Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a diÆcult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms i...

In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources (e.g. spectrum resources in wireless communications). Unfortunately, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealedbid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. On the other hand, perfor...

I present two modifications of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism to accommodate bidders’ budget constraints in the combinatorial auction setting and show that they are Pareto-Optimal and (partially) incentive compatible in certain domains.

In mass customization, companies strive to enhance customer value by providing products and services that are approximate to customers’ needs. A company’s strategy of allocating its limited capacity to meeting diverse customer requirements directly impact customer perceived value in terms of available options, cost, and schedule. Proposed in this paper is an auction-based mass customization mod...

For the past 17 years, much of the work on combinatorial auctions (CAs) has used the Combinatorial Auction Test Suite (CATS) by Leyton-Brown et al. [24]. However, CATS does not include a good model for spectrum auctions, which have become the most important application of CAs. In this paper, we make four contributions. First, we propose the Multi-Region Value Model (MRVM) which captures the dif...

Though the VCG auction assumes a central place in the mechanism design literature, there are a number of reasons for favoring iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs). Several promising ICA formats were developed based on primal-dual and subgradient algorithms. Prices are interpreted as a feasible dual solution and the provisional allocation is interpreted as a feasible primal solution. iBundle(...