Auctions, when well designed, result in desirable economic outcomes and have been widely used in solving real-world resource allocation problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. The field of auction mechanism design has drawn much attention in recent years from economists, mathematicians, and computer scientists. In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewed as games of inco...

Competitive electricity markets which rely on centralized dispatch require a mechanism to solicit offers from competing generators. Ideally, such an auction mechanism provides incentives to submit offers equal to the marginal cost of generation for each generator. Economic theory suggests that the Uniform Price auction is an appropriate institution. However, an efficient implementation of this ...

In a seminal paper, McAfee (1992) presented a truthful mechanism for double auction, attaining asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade without any prior information on the valuations of the traders. McAfee’s mechanism handles single-parametric agents, allowing each seller to sell a single item and each buyer to buy a single item. In this paper, we present a double-auction mechanism that handles ...

This paper evaluates performance of human subjects and instances of a bidding model that interact in continuous-time double auction experiments. Asks submitted by instances of the seller model (“automated sellers”) maximize the seller’s expected surplus relative to a heuristic belief function, and arrive stochastically according to an exponential distribution. Automated buyers are similar. Acro...

We envision a future economy where e-markets will play an essential role as exchange hubs for commodities and services. Future e-markets should be designed to be robust to manipulation, flexible, and sufficiently efficient in facilitating exchanges. One of the most important aspects of designing an e-market is market mechanism design. A market mechanism defines the organization, information exc...

The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral co-operations between selfinterested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social co-operations, for example, allocation of high level jobs or finding a suitable partner to marry. In a barter double auction, there is a set of agents. Every agent has a vector of parameters which specifies h...

The idea of this paper is an advanced game concept. This concept is expected to model non-monetary bilateral cooperations between self-interested agents. Such non-monetary cases are social cooperations like allocation of high level jobs or sexual relationships among humans. In a barter double auction, there is a big amount of agents. Every agent has a vector of parameters which specifies his de...

Real market institutions, stock and commodity exchanges for example, do not occur in isolation. The same stocks and commodities may be listed on multiple exchanges, and traders who want to deal in those goods have a choice of markets in which to trade. While there has been extensive research into agentbased trading in individual markets, there is little work on this kind of multiple market scen...

Many electronic markets are linked together into larger “network markets” where the links reflect constraints on traders. These constraints mean that a choice to trade in one market limits the trader’s choice of other markets to use. This kind of network market is important because so many basic products, including gas, water, and electricity, are traded in such markets, and yet it has been lit...

Cooperative communication is an active area of research, and wireless devices are evolving into multipurpose systems with data extensive applications running on them, by this such applications require strong error protection and high speed connectivity. These networks are emerging to support the varied networks for an effective communication between the end users. The overall network performanc...