Verifying Security Properties in Electronic Voting Machines

Electronic voting system is an important tool which allows voters to vote over the Internet without the geographical restrictions with considers important criteria in evaluating electronic voting schemes such as the mobility, democracy, and privacy. There are a number of voting systems adopted all over the world with each of them having its peculiar problems. The main task of this paper is to i...

In this contribution, we explore the use of e-voting based cryptographic protocols to implement synchronous as well as asynchronous online electronic evaluation procedures in order to alleviate the problems arising from the lack of interpersonal transaction in open and distance learning environments. Our approach is based on the similarity of privacy requirements exhibited on such environments ...

We describe a single framework in which to view the end-to-endindependently-verifiable (E2E) polling-place voting systems with a mixnet back-end. We use the framework to invent new systems that combine front and back-ends from existing systems.

With the increasing popularity public key infrastructures have been acquiring in recent years and the legislative support for digital signatures, electronic voting protocols are moving from a strictly research area to the commercial arena. In this paper we examine the role public key infrastructures play in electronic voting in various protocols proposed in the literature, some of which are the...

Deniable encryption is an important cryptographic primitive, essential in all cryptographic protocols where a coercive adversary comes to play with high potential. Deniable encryption plays a key role in the internet/electronic voting, electronic bidding, electronic auctions and secure multiparty computation. In this study a practical efficient receiver deniable encryption scheme based on BCP c...

Most electronic voting systems in use today provide printouts so called voter verifiable paper audit trails (VVPATs). Voters are supposed to verify these before they put them into the ballot box in order to detect election fraud. A number of studies have shown that voters are unlikely to do so when using current systems. Thus, it is very likely that malicious electronic voting systems print the...

It had been thought that it is difficult to provide receiptfreeness in mixnet-based electronic voting schemes. Any kind of user chosen randomness can be used to construct a receipt, since a user can prove to a buyer how he had encrypted the ballot. In this paper we propose a simple and efficient method to incorporate receipt-freeness in mixnetbased electronic voting schemes by using the well kn...

It is generally considered that a key component of electronic government in the future will be electronic voting, as a means of facilitating the participation of citizens in elections and public debates. However, a long path has to be pursued before electronic voting, particularly if based on Internet, is accepted as a reliable system alternative to conventional methods. In this paper, we propo...

Many electronic voting protocols assume the voter votes with some computing device. This raises the question whether a voter can trust the device he is using. Three years ago, Chaum, and independently Neff, proposed what we call bare-handed electronic voting, where voters do not need any computational power in the voting booth. Their protocols have a strong unforgeability guarantee. The price f...