In a general equilibrium model with a central bank (CB) and a continuum of private agents, there are two groups of agents, owners and workers. The objective of the CB is to maximize a weighted average of utilities of these two groups. There are two possible types of the CB, differing in the relative weights in averaging the two groups’ utilities. The realized type of the CB is private informati...

Existence of competitive equilibria in the overlapping-generations model has been studied in some detail; see [4-6,9]. We need to know more about the properties of these equilibria. How many are there? How do they depend on the basic parameters of the economy? We also need to compare the set of monetary competitive equilibria with the set of nonmonetary competitive equilibria. Are there “vastly...

It is shown that for the generalized rigid body certain Cartan subalgebras (called of coordinate type) of so(n) are equilibrium points for the rigid body dynamics. In the case of so(4) there are three coordinate type Cartan subalgebras which on a regular adjoint orbit give three Weyl group orbits of equilibria. These coordinate type Cartan subalgebras are the analogues of the three axes of equi...

We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid – i.e., bid above their values. Coarse...

Pre-play signals which cost nothing are sometimes thought to be of no significance in interactions which are not games of pure common interest. We investigate the effect of pre-play signals in an evolutionary setting for Assurance, or Stag Hunt, games and for a Bargaining game. The evolutionary game with signals is found to have dramatically different dynamics from the same game without signals...

We study uniqueness of Nash equilibria in atomic splittable congestion games and derive a uniqueness result based on polymatroid theory: when the strategy space of every player is a bidirectional flow polymatroid, then equilibria are unique. Bidirectional flow polymatroids are introduced as a subclass of polymatroids possessing certain exchange properties. We show that important cases such as b...

Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which easy find. In contrast, we prove that, directed networks, a broad range of public intractable equilibrium problems: The existence equilibria is NP-hard decide, and mixed PPAD-hard We define general utility games, complexity dichotomy result for finding PPAD-completeness proof equilibria. Even the d...

The study of games and their equilibria is central to developing insights for understanding many socio-economic phenomena. Here we present a dynamical systems view of the equilibria of two-person, payoff-symmetric games. In particular, using this perspective, we discuss the differences between two solution concepts for such games namely, those of Nash equilibrium and co-action equilibrium. For ...

We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outomces in continuous time, double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. Since competitive equilibria need not exist in markets with price contols, we investigated the nature of non-price competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality competition model based on matching theory. Equilibria ...

This paper explores the optimal treatment of an infectious disease in a Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible model, where there are two strains of the disease and one strain is more infectious than the other. The strains are perfectly distinguishable, instantly diagnosed and equally costly in terms of social welfare. Treatment is equally costly and effective for both strains. Eradication is not pos...