We explore a new method for identifying leaders and followers, LF, in repeated games by analyzing an experimental, repeated (50 rounds) game where Row player shifts the payoff between small and large values-a type of "investor" and Column player determines who gets the payoff-a type of "manager". We found that i) the Investor (Row) most often is a leading player and the manager (Column) a follo...

Proof of Proposition 4.1. We begin allowing a MPE in mixed strategies. When the leader meets follower i in state m, she makes an offer p(m) with probability γm ∈ [0, 1]. The follower accepts the offer with probability αm ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the follower i meeting the leader in state m accepts only if δwout(m−1)+p(m) ≥ δw(m), and accepts with probability one if this inequality holds strictly. No...

We consider the problem of distributed leader-follower formation control for nonholonomic mobile robots equipped with central-panoramic cameras. By specifying the desired formation in the image plane, we translate the control problem into a separate visual servoing task for each follower. We use a rank constraint on the omnidirectional optical flows across multiple frames to estimate the positi...

In a Stackelberg network pricing game leader sets prices for given subset of edges so as to maximize profit, after which one or multiple followers choose shortest path. Our main result shows that the profit when allowing negative can be factor ?(log?(m?k¯)) larger than maximum with only positive prices, where m is number priceable and k¯?2m followers. particular, this cannot bounded single foll...

Two competitors, a Leader and a Follower, are sequentially creating their hub and spoke networks to attract customers in a market where prices have fixed markups. Each competitor wants to maximize his profit, rather than a market share. Demand is split according to the logit model. The goal is to find the optimal hub and spoke topology for the Leader. We represent this Stackelberg game as a non...

The environment of the (r|p)-centroid problem is composed of two noncooperative firms, a leader and a follower, competing to serve the demand of customers from a given market. The demand of each customer is totally served by a facility of the leader or follower according to a customer choice rule. The goal of both the leader and the follower is to maximize its own market share. The (r|p)-centro...

This paper tackles the issue of choosing roles in duopoly games. First, it is shown that the two necessary (and su¢cient, if both satis...ed) conditions for sequential play to emerge at equilibrium are that both leader and follower are at least weakly better o¤ than under simultaneous play. Second, by means of a two-stage game of vertical di¤erentiation, it is shown that if ...rms can commit to...

Vehicle platoon approaches found in literature deal generally with column formations adapted to urban or highway transportation systems. This paper presents an approach in which each platoon vehicle follows a virtual vehicle, in order to cope with issues such as different platoon geometries. Those different types of formations can be encountered in a wide range of field such as the military or ...

Traditional spectral clustering methods cannot naturally learn the number of communities in a network and often fail to detect smaller community structure in dense networks because they are based upon external community connectivity properties such as graph cuts. We propose an algorithm for detecting community structure in networks called the leader-follower algorithm which is based upon the na...

Basic bilevel programming deals with hierarchical optimization problems in which the leader at the upper level attempts to optimize his/her objective, subject to a set of constraints and his/her follower’s solution, and the follower at the lower level tries to find an optimized strategy according to each of possible decisions made by the leader. Three issues may be involved in a basic bilevel d...