The paper provides a framework to help the weak retailer delineate the circumstances that allow him to benefit from an alliance between the dominant retailer and the common manufacturer. We use a game-theoretic model to determine the optimal pricing and service strategies when channel members act independently then when the dominant retailer forms an alliance with the manufacturer. We find that...

We investigate advertising level, pricing and production decision problems in a supply chain when demand and cost disruptions occur simultaneously. The channel consists of one manufacturer and one retailer where demand depends on retail price and advertisement expenditure. We examine the case in both cooperative game and non-cooperative Stackelberg game.

Simultaneous reductions in inventory of raw materials, work-in-process, and finished items have recently become a major focus in supply chain management. Vendor-managed inventory is a well-known practice in supply chain collaborations, in which manufacturer manages inventory at the retailer and decides about the time and replenishment. In this paper, an integrated vendor-managed inventory model...

We consider a two echelon supply chain: a single retailer holds a finished goods inventory to meet an i.i.d. customer demand, and a single manufacturer produces the retailer’s replenishment orders on a make-to-order basis. In this setting the retailer’s order decision has a direct impact on the manufacturer’s production. It is a well known phenomenon that inventory control policies at the retai...

We consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer (capacitated supplier) and two retailers. We characterize the manufacturer’s optimal production policy under selective-information sharing, in which the manufacturer receives demand and inventory information from only one of the two retailers. We show that the manufacturer’s optimal production policy is a state-dependent base-stock polic...

In a three stage supply chain composed of one manufacturer, one distributor and one retailer, the supply chain coordination mechanism is studied under a fuzzy demand environment. The market demand is treated as a positive trapezoidal fuzzy number, and the models of centralized decision-making system and spanning revenue sharing (SRS) contract are proposed by the method of the fuzzy set theory. ...

Many retailers designate a national brand manufacturer as a "category captain" to help manage the entire category. The category captain is involved in decisions that a¤ect not only its own brands, but also those of its rivals. We examine how engaging a self-interested category captain a¤ects the category captain, the retailer and the rival manufacturer, when the category captain is responsible ...

The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures. We suggest a differential game model of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer that agree on the contract parameters at the outset of the game. The model includes key oper...