The main justification for cash-in-advance (CIA) equilibria when there are multiple assets is a Shapley-Shubik trading-post model where the agents coordinate on a particular medium of exchange. Of course, there are other equilibria. We introduce a refinement and show that the CIA equilibrium does not satisfy our refinement while there exist equilibria that do.

Computing equilibria of multiplayer noncooperative normal form games is a difficult computational task. In games having more equilibria mathematical algorithms are not capable to detect all equilibria at a time. Evolutionary algorithms are powerful search tools for solving difficult optimization problems. It is shown how an evolutionary algorithm designed for multimodal optimization can be used...

The papers in this symposium address the issue of multiple equilibria that can be induced by monetary policy in models with capital accumulation. In particular they examine how the “Taylor Principle,” under which interest rates respond more than proportionately to increases in inflation, can generate multiple equilibria. They also explore the design of policies to avoid the problem of multiple ...

We discuss linear Ricardo models with a range of parameters. We show that the exact boundary of the region of equilibria of these models is obtained by solving a simple integer programming problem. We show that there is also an exact correspondence between many of the equilibria resulting from families of linear models and the multiple equilibria of economies of scale models.

We propose a procedure for computing Nash equilibria in multi-player timed games with reachability objectives. Our procedure is based on the construction of a finite concurrent game, and on a generic characterization of Nash equilibria in (possibly infinite) concurrent games. Along the way, we use our characterization to compute Nash equilibria in finite concurrent games.

The interchangeability property of Nash equilibria in two-player zerosum games is well-known. This paper studies possible generalizations of this property to multi-party zero-sum games. A form of interchangeability property for strict Nash equilibria in such games is established. It is also shown, by proving a completeness theorem, that strict Nash equilibria do not satisfy any other non-trivia...

This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. JEL classification numbers: C73, C61, C62.

In this paper, we investigate the existence of Pareto and weak Pareto equilibria for multiobjective games without compactness. By employing an existence theorem of Pareto equilibria due to Yu and Yuan([10]), several existence theorems of Pareto and weak Pareto equilibria for the multiobjective games are established in a similar way to Flores-Bázan([4]).

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.

A ferromagnetic oxide mineral with spinel structure was separated from Hawaiian volcanic rocks ranging from basalt to trachyte . The chemical compositions of all the specimens have been arranged on an oxygen reaction line, and can safely be interpreted as the result of a process of either oxidation or reduction of material with composition on or near this line. In the trachyte the mineral was f...