A game with a restricted cooperation is a triple (N, v,Ω), where N is a finite set of players, Ω ⊂ 2 , N ∈ Ω is a collection of feasible coalitions, v : Ω→ R is a characteristic function. The definition implies that if Ω = 2 , then the game (N, v,Ω) = (N, v) is the classical TU cooperative game. The class of all games with a restricted cooperation G with an arbitrary universal set of players is...

Previously we proposed a scheme to generate fuzzy rule-based multiclassification systems by means of bagging, mutual information-based feature selection, and a multicriteria genetic algorithm (GA) for static component classifier selection guided by the ensemble training error. In the current contribution we extend the latter component by the use of two bi-criteria fitness functions, combining t...

Many real-world decision making problems require multiple criteria which can be from different nature. This implies to define a heterogeneous context with different types of information that experts will use to provide their assessments. But sometimes, experts do not have enough knowledge or information to assess the criteria and they hesitate to express their assessments. Therefore, in this co...

This paper deals with preference representation on combinatorial domains and preference-based recommendation in the context of multicriteria or multiagent decision making. The alternatives of the decision problem are seen as elements of a product set of attributes and preferences over solutions are represented by generalized additive decomposable (GAI) utility functions modeling individual pref...

Burkholderia pseudomallei is the etiological agent of melioidosis, a disease endemic in parts of Southeast Asia and Northern Australia. Currently there is no licensed vaccine against infection with this biological threat agent. In this study, we employed an immunoproteomic approach and identified bacterial Elongation factor-Tu (EF-Tu) as a potential vaccine antigen. EF-Tu is membrane-associated...

We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TU-games using a relaxed feasibility condition, non-emptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the C-core ([Guesnerie and Oddou, 1979] and [Sun, Trockel, and Yang, 2008]) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The la...

Anew entropymeasure of interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy set (IVIFS) is proposed by using cotangent function, which overcomes several limitations in the existing methods for calculating entropy of IVIFS. The efficiency of the new entropy is demonstrated by comparing it with several classical entropies.Moreover, an entropy weightmodel is established to determine the entropy weights for fuzzy ...

We associate an optimistic TU game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition S as the cost of connecting agents in S to the source assuming that agents in N\S are already connected to the source, and agents in S can connect through agents in N\S. We study the Shapley value of this new game.