Previous work shows that reputation results may fail in repeated games with long-run players with equal discount factors. We restrict attention to stage games where two players, with equal discount factors, move sequentially. A pure Stackelberg action is assumed to exist. One and two sided reputation results are provided. If one of the players is a Stackelberg type with positive probability, th...

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, ...rms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a ...rm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the other ...rm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a ...rm can observe the other ...rm’s pe...

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms’ strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mix...

Given a prediction of opponent behavior in a general-sum two-player normal form game, it is difficult to select a strategy that balances the opportunity to use the prediction to inform one’s action with the risk of becoming predictable. We propose Restricted Stackelberg Response with Safety (RSRS), a novel way of generating such a strategy. RSRS uses an r-safe Stackelberg equilibrium in a modif...

considered supply chain in this article consists of one vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor applies vendor managed inventory. considering vendor as a leader and retailers as followers, stackelberg game theory is applied for modeling and analyzing this system. a general mixed integer nonlinear model is developed which can optimizes the performance of the system under revenue sharing c...

Two-player Stackelberg games and their applications to security are currently a very hot topic in the field of Algorithmic Game Theory [7]. In two-player Stackelberg games, instead of having the players move simultaneously, one player is designated as the leader and one as the follower. The game then works as follows: the leader chooses a strategy (possibly mixed) to commit to which the followe...

In common interest games in which players are motivated to coordinate their strategies to achieve a jointly optimal outcome, orthodox game theory provides no general reason or justification for choosing the required strategies. In the simplest cases, where the optimal strategies are intuitively obvious, human decision makers generally coordinate without difficulty, but how they achieve this is ...

Building on the successful applications of Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) to protect infrastructure, researchers have begun focusing on applying game theory to green security domains such as protection of endangered animals and fish stocks. Previous efforts in these domains optimize defender strategies based on the standard Stackelberg assumption that the adversaries become fully aware of th...

In this paper, several seller–buyer supply chain models are proposed which incorporate both cost factors as well as elements of competition and cooperation between seller and buyer. We assume that unit marketing expenditure and unit price charged by the buyer influence the demand of the product being sold. The relationships between seller and buyer will be modeled by non-cooperative and coopera...