Price cap regulation (PCR) has now been employed in the telecommunications industry for more than a quarter century. We review the experience with PCR and offer an explanation for its popularity. PCR’s design flexibility, its ability to limit undesirable strategic behavior, declining industry costs, and developing competition all enhanced the appeal of PCR. We also review some surprises that ha...

We study a model with local public goods in which agents’ crowding e¤ects are formally distinguished from their taste types. It has been shown that the core of such an economy can be decentralized with anonymous admission prices (which are closely related to cost share prices). Unfortunately, such a price system allows for an arbitrary relationship between the public goods level in a given juri...

This paper uses an adapted version of the linear tracing procedure, suggested by Harsanyi and Selten (1988), in order to discriminate between two types of multiple Nash equilibria. Equilibria of the same type are pay-off equivalent in the analysed multiple-unit unit price auction where two sellers compete in order to serve a fixed demand. The equilibria where the firm with the larger capacity b...

M often employ market response models as decision aids and historical information of competitors’ market outcomes to aid their competitive decisions in oligopolistic settings. However, little is known about how access to a decision aid or the availability of competitors’ market outcomes impact a firm’s competitive decisions (e.g., prices) or market outcomes resulting from those decisions (e.g.,...

The way that companies choose to define market segments influences which products they develop, drives the features incorporated in those products, and shapes how they take them to market. Segmentation schemes define who is framed as competitors; and how large specific market opportunities are believed to be. Most marketers segment their markets along lines defined by the characteristics of the...

We study procurement auctions in which, as is common in practice, a group of sellers (incumbents, qualified bidders) is given an advantage, based, for example, on better reliability, quality, or incumbency status. We show conditions under which for any given first price handicap auction, there is a simple second-price design which dominates it. This generalizes a previous result for the case of...