A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner. There have been several studies on characterizing strategyproof allocation rules. In particular, a condition called weakmonotonicity has been identified as a full characterization of strategy-proof allocation rules. Mor...

This paper investigates the computability problem of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem [A.F. Gibbard, Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result, Econometrica 41 (1973) 587–601; M.A. Satterthwaite, Strategyproofness and Arrow’s conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions, Journal of Economic Theory 10 (1975) 187–217] of social choic...

In the single-peaked domain, median rule is strategy-proof but not implementable in (Bayes–)Nash equilibrium by its associated direct mechanism. We define value-based mechanism that implements domain under complete and incomplete information. Such a selects of profile different values announced agents (i.e., ignoring redundant announcements). The does depend on agents’ beliefs (in line with rob...

IT systems with advanced security requirements increasingly apply problem-specific security policies for describing, analyzing, and implementing security properties. Security policies are a vital part of a system’s trusted computing base (TCB). Hence, both correctness and tamper-proofness of a TCB’s implementation are essential for establishing, preserving, and guaranteeing a system’s security ...

The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted for voting. Unfortunately, it incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (PAR), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin (MM), strategy-proofness (SP). Such incompatibilities are often known as impossibility theorems, proved by worst-case analysis. Previous work has investigated the likelihood these impossibilities to ...