When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer’s price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer’s gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer’s degree of prudence and the extent of ...

We extend the Consumption-based CAPM (C-CAPM) model for representative agents with different risk attitudes. We introduce the concept of expectation dependence and show that for a risk averse representative agent, it is the first-degree expectation dependence rather than the covariance that determines C-CAPM’s riskiness. We extend the assumption of risk aversion to prudence and provide a weaker...

This paper extends the research about the impact of an increase in background risk from cases with one decision variable to those with two decision variables. We apply the results of Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) to examine the comparative statics of an increase in background risk on demand for loss reduction that depends on market insurance and self-insurance together. We find that individuals ...

This paper models choice under risk, whether such choices are over simple lotteries or over lotteries that arise from a portfolio of endogenously generated shares of assets. Our model satisfies various prudence and risk aversion conditions, is consistent with Allais paradox rankings, and generates various insurance-related results. Within a portfolio framework with compounded reinvestments, our...