learns or should have learned of the risk created by its fault.” Jablonski v. Ford Motor Co., 955 N.E.2d 1138, 1159 (Ill. 2011) (emphasis added). See also Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Mich. 1959); Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 922 (Wis. 1979); Downing v. Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1032 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Wilson v. U.S. Elevator Corp...

Uniform-price auctions are studied in which the seller may cancel part of the supply after observing the bids. This feature eliminates many of the ‘collusive seeming’ equilibria of the auction. In equilibrium the seller always sells the full quantity.  2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Online markets pose a difficulty for evaluating products, particularly experience goods, such as used cars, that 11 cannot be easily described online. This exacerbates product uncertainty, the buyer’s difficulty in evaluating 12 product characteristics, and predicting how a product will perform in the future. However, the IS literature 13 has focused on seller uncertainty and ignored product un...

We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution D in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational and will perfectly reason about how their bids today affect the seller’s decisions tomorrow. In this work we initiate a different direction: the buyer simply r...

In e-commerce environments, the trustworthiness of a seller is very important to potential buyers, especially when the seller is not known to them. Most existing trust evaluation models compute a single value to reflect the general trustworthiness of a seller without taking any transaction context information into account. With such a result as the indication of reputation, a buyer may be easil...