Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 2 What is IoT? ......................................................................................................................................... 2 What are the defining features of IoT? ...................................................

This paper analyses the incentive properties of prospective payment systems for hospital contracts, a key feature in many health systems’ reforms. Building on current literature, the model explicitly allows for the existence of waiting time, modelled as adversely affecting patients’ utility and therefore reducing social welfare. The model shows that rewarding hospitals for their demand leads to...

This paper examines the development of legal contract enforcement in a political economy context. The key insight is that, in earlier times when relational contracts are used predominantly, the rich elite agents must have enjoyed comparative advantages in using relational contracts than the poor and thus would bene…t less from investing in legal enforcement. The paper …nds that high income ineq...

Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement* The game-theoretic bargaining literature insists on non-cooperative bargaining procedure but allows 'cooperative' implementation of agreements. The effect of this is to allow free-reign of bargaining power with no check upon it. In reality, courts cannot implement agreements costlessly, and parties often prefer to use 'non-cooperative' implementation. We p...

We select a Korean case with ample subcontracting practices and a rigid wage system. Workplaces with subcontract transactions would have reason to impute the additional wage incremental costs associated with the seniority-based wage system (Hobong in Korea) to subcontractors. Our empirical results identify the cost-transferring mechanism under which the cost of wage rigidity for contractors is ...

If people are free to contract, will outcomes be efficient? We study the question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. With mandatory participation, efficiency is attaina...

We consider renegotiation of social earnings insurance arrangements by majority voting in an economy where ex-ante identical individuals make unobservable private investments in education. We show that voting-based renegotiation can result in a higher expected level of investment in comparison to the case where social insurance is determined by an appointed social planner. We also find that, wi...

While some argue that incomplete incentive contracts facilitate the self-enforcement of informal dealings, other authors submit that they substitute for or “crowd out” social norms supporting informal arrangements. We use experimental evidence to test these theories by manipulating the extent to which individuals transact repeatedly and the level of contract costs. We find that, by enforcing co...

With a predilection for market solutions, neoliberalism upholds that the individual is generally the best judge of his or her interests. Yet markets are never universally applied as a mechanism of allocation and there are reasons, in principle, why capitalism will always have ‘‘missing markets.’’ Concentrating on the application and appropriateness of neoliberal theory to the workplace, this ar...