In the social decision making context, a manipulator attempts to change the social choice in his favor by misrepresenting his preferences. Gibbard and Satterthwaite [7,10] established independently that a strategic manipulation can be observed when using any non-dictatorial voting choice procedure. In this paper, we are interested in the manipulation of the social choice when individuals reveal...

This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients’ hospital choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected by a general practitioner (GP). It proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both, patient and GP level optimization, and it discusses identification. The empirical analysis demonstrates biases and inconsistencies that arise when strateg...

In this note, we characterize the equilibria of the standard pivotal-voter participation game between two groups of voters of asymmetric sizes, as originally proposed by Palfrey and Rosenthal [1983. A strategic calculus of voting. Public Choice. 41, 7-53].

A retailer following a competition-based dynamic pricing strategy tracks competitors' price changes and then must answer the following questions: (1) Should the retailer respond? (2) If so, respond to whom? (3) How much of a response? (4) And on which products? The answers require unbiased measures of price elasticity as well as accurate knowledge of competitor significance and the extent to wh...

To address the limitations of the traditional performance measurement systems (PMSs) in visualizing risk and preventing excessive managerial risk-taking, a number of research studies proposed to extend the functionality of PMSs by incorporating risk measures and goals and thereby enabling a better view on organizational risk exposures. While researchers still continue to provide claims regardin...

Competition and complementarities between …rms can occur simultaneously. To ‡exibly identify the nature of strategic interaction between GPs and specialist types in Belgium, we present a sequential equilibrium entry game of incomplete information. The results indicate that some specialists are strategic complements (gynecologists, TNE-specialists) and some are strategic substitutes in the entry...

As information technology (IT) becomes more accessible, sustaining any competitive advantage from it becomes challenging. This has caused some critics to dismiss IT as a less valuable resource. We argue that, in addition to being able to generate strategic advantage, IT should also be viewed as a strategic necessity that prevents competitive disadvantage in rapidly changing business environment...

In social interactions, strategic uncertainty arises when the outcome of one's choice depends on the choices of others. An important question is whether strategic uncertainty can be resolved by assessing subjective probabilities to the counterparts' behavior, as if playing against nature, and thus transforming the strategic interaction into a risky (individual) situation. By means of functional...

As information technology (IT) becomes more accessible, sustaining any competitive advantage from it becomes challenging. This has caused some critics to dismiss IT as a less valuable resource. We argue that, in addition to being able to generate strategic advantage, IT should also be viewed as a strategic necessity that prevents competitive disadvantage in rapidly changing business environment...

Analysis of strategic interaction among decision makers has recently become a major focus of economists and other social scientists. An example of such interaction includes interdependent choices of policy instruments by local or state governments. In this case, the optimal level of a jurisdiction's policy instrument depends on the levels chosen by other (perhaps neighboring) jurisdictions. Ano...