John Searle has argued that all perceptual experiences are token-reflexive, in the sense that they are constituents of their own veridicality conditions. Many philosophers have found the kind of token-reflexivity he attributes to experiences, which I will call causal token-reflexivity, unfaithful to perceptual phenomenology. In this paper, I develop an argument for a different sort of token-ref...

Let E be a Banach space. There are several natural ways in which any polynomial P ∈ P(E) can be extended to P̃ ∈ P(E), in such a way that the extension mapping is continuous and linear (see, for example, [6]). Taking the double transpose of the extension mapping P → P̃ yields a linear, continuous mapping from P(E) into P(E). Further, since P(E) is a dual space, it follows that there is a natural ...

Dutch has two reflexive pronouns, zich and zichzelf. When is each one used? This question has been debated in the literature on binding theory, reflexives and anaphora resolution. Partial solutions have attempted to use syntactic binding domains, semantic features and pragmatic concepts such as focus to predict reflexive choice, but until now no experimental data either in favor of or against o...