THE MODERATING INFLUENCE OF FIRM MARKET POWER ON THE TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS MODEL: AN EMPIRICAL TEST IN A FORWARD CHANNEL INTEGRATION CONTEXT TASADDUQ A. SHERVANI,* GARY FRAZIER, and GOUTAM CHALLAGALLA 1 Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, U.S.A. 2 The Marshall School of Business, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California U.S.A. 3 College o...

Although electronic commerce (e-commerce) can be a source of competitive advantage, will e-commerce businesses in countries like China flourish when governments still take a “wait-and-see attitude” as to prompting, protecting, and regulating e-commerce? The paper employs transaction cost economics in analyzing the role of government in regulating electronic contracting. Due to the transaction c...

The article develops a process and control model for the analysis and design of inter-firm relations, in which both opportunism and trust play a role. Its aim is to develop a tool which helps to analyze combinations, balances and imbalances of trust and opportunism, formal and informal forms of governance, and viable sequences of strategies of governance, depending on different conditions. It e...

This paper presents a model that complements the research stream of transaction cost economics with the dynamic capabilities approach. The paper shows that, even though technological alliances involving specific assets deployed in emerging industries are exposed to high transaction costs, they possess attributes that make them attractive. First, they facilitate the creation of tacit competencie...

This study builds on developments in transaction cost economics to examine how institutional environment and transaction (project) characteristics affect governance of inter-firm alliances. The focus is on the choice between equity and contractual alliance forms under differing regimes of intellectual property protection and other national institutional features. Empirical results identify tran...

Outsourcing has advanced to an important measure that is applied broadly in operations management. Nowadays, suppliers of manufacturing companies do not only provide direct material like raw material and operational supplements but offer components and advanced modules incurring many value-adding stages. Whereas in the past companies built up local supplier networks, they recently tend to searc...

This paper compares two approaches to the measurement of the resources devoted to the organisational task in the economy, i.e. Porat and Rubin’s ‘Information Economy’ and Wallis and North’s ‘Transaction Sector’. While there have been a number of studies using the information economy approach, it seems to have made way for a narrower focus on the information technology economy in recent years. T...

Academicians and practitioners are becoming increasingly interested in the economics of Information Technology (IT). In part, this interest stems from the increased role that IT now plays in the strategic thinking of most large organizations, and from the significant dollar costs expended by these organizations on IT. Naturally enough, researchers are turning to economics as a reference discipl...

This paper focuses on the choice of the governance form of strategic alliances. We survey arguments inspired by the transaction cost economics tradition and other contractual perspectives on the theory of the firm, according to which such choice mainly depends on the transaction cost economizing properties of different organizational forms. We proposes additional considerations based on evoluti...

The concept of “contract” has similar but not identical interpretations for lawyers and economists. Both Economic and Legal theories distinguish transactions from contracts based on the possibility to rely on court enforcement. Formal and informal promises are enforceable by courts, however there is not a clear distinction between a contract and an agreement since agents do not know a priori th...