This note argues about a central analytical inconsistency of Ericson and Pakes (1995). Notwithstanding the explicit claims of the article, the formal hypotheses employed there imply that a firm’s investments do not affect both the evolution of this firm and the dynamics of the whole industry. JEL Classification Numbers: C62, D57, E13, L11.

This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. JEL classification numbers: C73, C61, C62.

We investigate the connection between equilibrium existence and its attainability through simple market mechanisms in exchange economies with indivisibilities and complementarities. The analysis suggests that attaining efficient outcomes through simple non-combinatorial auctions may be problematic even when market clearing prices exist. JEL classification code: C62, D44, D51

The purpose of this paper is to give a global characterization of excess demand functions in a two period exchange economy with incomplete real asset markets. We show that continuity, homogeneity and Walras’ law characterize the aggregate excess demand functions on any compact price set which maintains the dimension of the budget set. JEL classification: D52, C62.

We show the existence of a pure strategy, symmetric, increasing equilibrium in double auction markets with correlated private valuations and many participants. The equilibrium we find is arbitrarily close to fully revealing as the market size grows. Our results provide strategic foundations for price-taking behavior in large markets. JEL Classification: C62, C72, D44, D82

I propose a simple simulation procedure for large games with multiple equilibria. The simulation procedure is based on a best-response dynamic. The implied equilibrium selection mechanism is intuitive: more stable equilibria are selected with higher probability. JEL Codes: C62, C72, C73

The paper proposes an Euler equation technique for analyzing the stability of differentiable stochastic programs. The main innovation is to use marginal reward directly as a Foster–Lyapunov function. This allows us to extend known stability results for stochastic optimal growth models, both weakening hypotheses and strengthening conclusions. JEL classification: C61; C62; O41

In this paper, we provide an alternative definition of NTU convexity, strongly ordinal convexity. We show that if a game is strongly ordinal convex, then any marginal worth vector is in the core, and any marginal contribution is increasing. Some economic examples satisfy this convexity. KeywordsCooperative game; Convex game; NTU game; Core; Supermodularity JEL classification codes: C62; D52; D53

Competitive equilibria are shown to exist in two-object exchange economies with indivisibilities and additive complementarities in agent valuations between objects, provided that complementarities are common across agents. We further investigate whether the competitive equilibrium can be obtained as an outcome of a simultaneous English-type auction mechanism under non-strategic (honest) bidding...