abstract: the main goal of this paper is to modeling of producers’ strategic suggestions for each electricity manufacturer in an oligopolistic structure. according to the proposed structure of the electricity market modeling; this paper uses a dynamic model based on cournot equilibrium. due to the large volume of required information, the implementation of the model is limited to a regional ele...

Donor_s demand equations for alternative forms of aid are derived for three allocation processes: noncooperative Nash-Cournot, cooperative Lindahl, and bureaucratic. Based on OECD data for official development assistance for 1970– 2001, we apply non-nested tests to distinguish between Nash-Cournot and Lindahl reduced-form equations for 15 major donor nations. Noncooperative Nash-Cournot behavio...

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one o...

The paper presents simulation of two classic duopoly games, those of Cournot and Bertrand. The simulation is done with a very simple Discrete Event Simulation system, aGPSS, developed for economics students. With the Cournot model one can study under which conditions the Cournot solution will be obtained even if the parties lack knowledge about demand and costs. The Bertrand model, with stochas...

This paper shows that the cost as well as the effectiveness of technology has a differential impact on technology adoption under two alternative modes of competition. If the cost of the technology is high, Bertrand competition provides a stronger incentive to adopt technology than Cournot competition unless the effectiveness of the technology is very low. On the contrary, if the cost of the tec...

Abstract We construct a Cournot model with uncertainty in the number of firms industry. such an as Poisson game and characterize set equilibria after deriving novel properties distribution. When marginal costs are zero, increases expected ( n ) for $$n\ge 3$$ n ≥ 3 ...

Studies on information sharing in oligopolies focus either Cournot or Bertrand markets. We consider a Cournot–Bertrand market where owners provide strategic managerial incentives and can share the details of their compensation contracts. find that firm punishes its manager for sales, whereas rewards sales. Both firms contract if firms' products are sufficiently differentiated. However, product ...

We report on an experiment designed to compare Stackelberg and Cournot duopoly markets with quantity competition. We implement both a random matching and a fixed-pairs version for each market. Stackelberg markets yield, regardless of the matching scheme, higher outputs than Cournot markets and, thus, higher efficiency. For Cournot markets, we replicate a pattern known from previous experiments....

In a simple agent-based model of a small oligopoly nonrenewable natural resource model, the agents, communicating solely through the market price, sometimes exhibit collusion-like behavior, sometimes Cournot-like behavior. The collusion-like behavior is shown to arise when di erences between the agents are small. Conversely, the Cournot-like behavior is shown to result from di erences in produc...

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot–Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot– Nash outcome and one ...