Multi Attributes Procurement Auction is a well known solution for negotiation between sellers and buyers. Seller wants to sell the product with more prices while buyer wants to buy the product with fewer prices. This problem has been analyzed by game theory approach and one optimal solution is achieved for the seller and the buyer with this assumption that the seller knows the exact value of th...

Multi-attribute auctions (also called multidimensional auctions) facilitate negotiations based on multiple attributes, thus escape from the standard price-only domain into a rich multidimensional domain that can comprise additional attributes like e.g. guarantee conditions or quality. Most multi-attribute preference models used in auction mechanisms are based on a ranking derived from weighted ...

In most electronic auctions conducted over the Internet today price is still the only decision criteria for the best bid. This is true for all sorts of auctions in the electronic business areas consumer-to-consumer (c2c), business-toconsumer (b2c), and business-to-business (b2b). Especially for many situations in the b2b area there are other important attributes apart from price to be considere...

Proving the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss the strategy proofness of a multi-attribute auction mechanism using three different approaches: the analysis of the mechanism properties, a mathematical analysis to determine if agents can take advantage of dishonest strategies and the use of simu...

In this paper, we suggest using an English Auction Protocol for a procurement multi-attribute auction in which the item for sale is defined by several attributes, the buyer agent is the auctioneer, and the seller agents are the bidders. Such domains include auctions on task allocation, services, or compound products. At the beginning of the auction the buyer agent announces the required propert...

Demonstrating the incentive compatibility of an auction mechanism is always a hard but essential work in auction mechanism design. In this paper we discuss three different approaches to proof or check such property in regard of a multi-attribute auction mechanism: by analyzing well-known sufficient conditions, by mathematical analyzing the rules that govern the mechanism, and by empirically che...