Auctions are the most widely used strategic gametheoretic mechanism in the Internet. Auctions have been mostly studied from a game-theoretic and economic perspective, although recent work in AI and OR has been concerned with computational aspects of auctions as well. When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging type of auctions. Combinator...

We survey experimental research on multi-unit auctions with an emphasis on topics that may be of a unifying interest to experimental, as well as theoretical and empirical economists. Topics include static and dynamic multi-unit auctions; combinatorial auctions and efficient auction design; simultaneous and sequential auctions; bidder asymmetry and endogenous entry, and collusion in auctions. We...

This paper analyzes U.S. PCS spectrum auctions in several key ways. First, a history of how the FCC came to the decision to auction spectrum rather than assign it using a different method is provided. Then, the specific rules and procedures used in the auctions are explained and the strengths and flaws of each significant auction trait are exposed. Auctions in the U.S. are compared to 3G auctio...

We provide evidence that the European Central Bank (ECB's) unconventional monetary policy dampens yield cycles in secondary markets for Eurozone sovereign debt around new auctions. This dampening effect tends to be larger when market volatility is higher. Cycles caused by domestic auctions and role of are largest countries with low credit ratings. Auctions these also generate significant auctio...

We study auctions with severe bounds on the communication allowed: each bidder may only transmit t bits of information to the auctioneer. We consider both welfareand profit-maximizing auctions under this communication restriction. For both measures, we determine the optimal auction and show that the loss incurred relative to unconstrained auctions is mild. We prove non-surprising properties of ...

* University of Belgrade, Faculty of Economics, [email protected] JEL CLASSIFICATION: D44 ABSTRACT: In sequential auctions objects are sold one by one in separate auctions. These sequential auctions might be organised as sequential first-price, second-price, or English auctions. We will derive equilibrium bidding strategies for these auctions. Theoretical models suggest that prices in sequent...

Abundant data has led to new opportunities for empirical auctions research in recent years, with much of the newest work on auctions of multiple objects, including: (i) auctions of ranked objects (such as sponsored-search ads), (ii) auctions of identical objects (such as Treasury bonds), and (iii) auctions of dissimilar objects (such as FCC spectrum licenses). This paper surveys recent developm...