In applying the common agency framework to the context of an oligopolistic industry, we want to go beyond the classical dichotomy between Cournot and Bertrand competition. We deÞne two games, the oligopolistic game and the corresponding concept of oligopolistic equilibrium, and an associated auxiliary game that can be interpreted as a common agency game and that has the same set of equilibria. ...

Abstract—A dynamic of Bertrand duopoly game is analyzed, where players use different production methods and choose their prices with bounded rationality. The equilibriums of the corresponding discrete dynamical systems are investigated. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment process are studied. The stability conditions of Nash equilibrium under a local adjustment...

The Bertrand paradox holds that price competition among at least two firms eliminates all profits in equilibrium, when firms have identical constant marginal costs. This assumes that the number of competitors is common knowledge among firms. If firms are uncertain about the number of their competitors, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. But in mixed strategies an equilibrium exists. In this...

In [14] Matsuda and Yorozu.explained that there is no special Bertrand curves in Eⁿ and they new kind of Bertrand curves called (1,3)-type Bertrand curves Euclidean space. In this paper , by using the similar methods given by Matsuda and Yorozu [14], we obtain that bitorsion of the quaternionic curve is not equal to zero in semi-Euclidean space E4^2. Obtain (N,B2) type quaternionic Bertrand cur...

This note examines equilibrium existence of Nash-Bertrand pricing games with discrete-choice models of demand. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition on the distribution of firm idiosyncratic shocks for best response correspondences to exhibit monotonicity. We then use Tarski’s fixed point result to show that the condition we provide generates a unique pure-strategy equilibrium. Moreov...

We look at the impact of a binding minimum wage on labor market outcomes and welfare distributions in a partial equilibrium model of matching and bargaining in the presence of on-the-job search. We use two different specifications of the Nash bargaining problem. In one, firms engage in a Bertrand competition for the services of an individual, as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). In the other, f...

A striking result in economic theory is that price competition between a small number of sellers producing a homogeneous good may result in the perfectly competitive market outcome. We analyze the formation of price-making contracts when there is the possibility of coalitional deviations from the market. We consider a market with a finite number of buyers and sellers and standard market primiti...

The present paper studies repeated Bertrand oligopoly with multiple markets. The markets are subject to independent, stochastic fluctuations in demands. According to the literature, the demand fluctuations generally hinder collusion, while the multimarket contact sometimes facilitates it. We show that when only partial collusion is sustainable under a single market, the per-market expected prof...

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for communication in low demand states. Therefore, partial communication in high demand states is sufficient t...