<p style='text-indent:20px;'>This paper investigates a manufacturer's retail outsourcing strategies under different competition modes with economies of scale. We focus on the effects market modes, scale and competitor's behavior decisions, then we develop four game models three modes. Firstly, find channel structure where both manufacturers choose cannot be an equilibrium Cournot competit...

" There is a big difference between a fair game and a game it's wise to play. "-Bertrand (1887b). 1 A brief history of ballot theorems 1.1 Discrete time ballot theorems We begin by sketching the development of the classical ballot theorem as it first appeared in the Comptes Rendus de l'Academie des Sciences. The statement that is fairly called the first Ballot Theorem was due to Bertrand: Theor...

This paper investigates supply chain coordination with side-payment contracts. We …rst summarize speci…c side-payment contracts and present our review on the literature that developed general sidepayment schemes to coordinate supply chains. Following our review, we discuss two criteria that a proper side-payment contract must satisfy, and accordingly introduce a decision-dependent transfer paym...

This article aims to capitalize on game theoretic techniques for optimal service marketing decision based existing literature review. The study collated relevant and reviewed the relationship that exists between theory mix—product, price, place, promotion within Telecommunication industry. Using techniques—prisoner’s dilemma, Cournot model, Bertrand quasi-game Stackelberg model making decisions...

We introduce a small cost of leading in the two-player action commitment game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). We investigate a price competition model and find that any randomized strategy equilibria converge to the Bertrand equilibrium. JEL classification numbers: L13, C72

One uses the model which has been already presented in articles by author: competition through prices (Bertrand competition), demands being deduced from consumers ‘utilities. can highlight three phenomena: “Monopolistic competition”: The products sold are enough differentiated, each firm having its “garden”, customers it keeps provided price is not higher than others’ prices. criterium “buy and...

In this paper we consider a setup of market interactions which may provide a stylized representation of realworld counterparts. We explore complementarities between analytical, agentbased and experimental approaches, as seems to be required by the problem. The BertrandEdgeworth game (priceseeting with capacity constraints) does not admit Nash equilibria in pure strategies; the mixed strategy eq...

We present in this paper an integrated study on the selfish behavior of the players participating in the system (modeled by a noncooperative game) and the myopic attitudes of the players (modeled by the ‘rolling-horizon’ type of strategies in the dynamic decision-making process), and introduce a solution termed myopic Nash equilibrium to characterize the equilibrium state when all the players a...

For some well-known games, such as the Traveler’s Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional gametheoretic solution concepts—most notably Nash equilibrium—predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. We introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, i...