The behavioural approach can be applied to both the design of an auction as well as to the implementation of a bidding strategy. This paper reports a case study in which we assisted a bidder in the German DCS1800 auction in the preparation for its bidding. We describe the various steps on this path: First, information that may be scattered in the company must be collected and aggregated. From t...

We have designed configurable agents to represent users in online auctions, specificMly the Michigan AuctionBot. The agents can be configured, started, and monitored from a web interface. We implemented three types of agents, distinguished by their different ways of using information in the auctions. A competitive agent does not use any information in the auction market. It chooses its actions ...

This paper designs a novel fuzzy competition and attitude based bidding strategy (FCA-Bid), in which the final best bid is calculated on the basis of the attitude of the bidders and the competition for the goods in the market. The estimation of attitude is based on the bidding item’s attribute assessment, which adapts the fuzzy sets technique to handle uncertainty of the bidding process as well...

This paper proposes a novel optimization algorithm Varying Population based Bacterial Foraging Algorithm (VPBFA), to solve optimal bidding strategy in a pool based electricity market. In a power market, Generating Companies (suppliers) participate in the bidding process in order to maximize their profits. Each supplier bid strategically for choosing the bidding coefficients to counter the compe...

Abstract of thesis entitled “Design and implementation of intelligent auction agents for Mobile AGent-based Internet Commerce System (MAGICS)” submitted by Jie Zhang for the degree of Master of Philosophy at The Hong Kong Polytechnic University in January 2004.of thesis entitled “Design and implementation of intelligent auction agents for Mobile AGent-based Internet Commerce System (MAGICS)” su...

This paper investigates utility maximising bidding heuristics for agents that participate in multiple heterogeneous auctions, in which the auction format and the starting and closing times can be different. Our strategy allows an agent to procure one or more items and to participate in any number of auctions. For this case, forming an optimal bidding strategy by global utility maximisation is c...

This paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidders increases (Wilson (1977)). Instead of analyzing the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we examine rationalizable strategies (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)) among the set o...