Truthful bidding is a desirable property for continuous double auctions (CDAs). Many incentive mechanisms have been proposed to elicit truthful bids. However, existing truthful CDA mechanisms often overlook the possibility that sellers may choose not to deliver the auctioned items to buyers as promised. In this situation, buyers may become unwilling to bid their true valuations in the future to...

Auctioning multi-dimensional items is a key challenge, which requires rigorous tools. This study proposes a multi-round, first-score, semi-sealed multi-attribute reverse auction system. A fundamental concern in multiattribute auctions is acquiring a useful description of the buyers’ individuated requirements: hard constraints and qualitative preferences. To consider real requirements, we expres...

In this paper, we present an agent which is able to negotiate the buying and selling of imperfectly sustitutable goods in a double auction style market. Two goods are said to be imperfectly substitutable if a buyer can use either of them, but prefers one over the other. For example, an electronics manufacturer using a RAM chip can use many suppliers to do this but may be willing to pay a premiu...

This paper deals with the market structure at the opening of the trading day and its influence on subsequent trading. We compare a single continuous double auction and two complement markets with different call auction designs as opening mechanisms in a unified experimental framework. The call auctions differ with respect to their levels of transparency. We find that a call auction not only imp...

Multi-attribute auctions (also called multidimensional auctions) facilitate negotiations based on multiple attributes, thus escape from the standard price-only domain into a rich multidimensional domain that can comprise additional attributes like e.g. guarantee conditions or quality. Most multi-attribute preference models used in auction mechanisms are based on a ranking derived from weighted ...

We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed...

In most electronic auctions conducted over the Internet today price is still the only decision criteria for the best bid. This is true for all sorts of auctions in the electronic business areas consumer-to-consumer (c2c), business-toconsumer (b2c), and business-to-business (b2b). Especially for many situations in the b2b area there are other important attributes apart from price to be considere...