We investigate the issue of strategic substitutability/complementarity in a Cournot differential game with sticky prices. We show that first order conditions do not produce instantaneous best reply functions. However, we identify negatively sloped reaction functions in steady state, with the open-loop best reply being flatter than its closed-loop counterpart. JEL classification: C73, D43, D92, ...

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which may not be interior and is globally stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.

We show that bounded monopoly profits are essential for the uniqueness of the Bertrand paradox (zero profit) outcome. Otherwise, a folk theorem obtains for one-shot homogeneous product Bertrand games: any positive (but finite) payoff vector can be achieved in a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. JEL Numbers: D43, C72

This paper reformulates the issue of the international coordination of monetary policy in the framework of an extended game with observable delay, where governments are required to set the timing of their respective actions before proceeding to the actual choice of their monetary policies. This allows to shrink signi...cantly the set of equilibria. JEL Classi...cation: D43, E61, F41, F42

The ubiquitously occuring non-specific lipid-transfer proteins (nsLTPs) in plants are implicated in key processes like biotic and abiotic stress, seed development and lipid transport. Additionally, they constitute a panallergen multigene family present in both food and pollen. Presently there are 49 nsLTP entries in the WHO/IUIS allergen database (http://allergen.org/). Analysis of full-length ...

The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically di®erentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a ̄xed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process. J.E.L. classi ̄cation...

Standard pricing theories consider consumers without temptation. With temptation and costly self-control, consumers dislike choice sets with tempting alternatives. We study firms’ strategy against such consumers, using Gul–Pesendorfer preferences and a game where firms compete by offering menus. JEL Classification: D43, L13, L15

Human Capital Externalities with Monopsonistic Competition This paper provides a novel microeconomic foundation for pecuniary human capital externalities in a labor market model of monopsonistic competition. Multiple equilibria arise because of a strategic complementarity in investment decisions. JEL Classification: D43, J24

Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially efficient. JEL Classification: C73, D43, L13

We show that in a duopoly operating in a congested market, with a general congestion function and an arbitrary distribution of consumer disutility for congestion, there cannot exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. We also show that whenever an equilibrium does exist it is unique. Closed form expressions for the symmetric equilibrium prices and profits are provided. JEL Classification Numbers: C...