This paper presents a framework for applying prediction markets to corporate decision making. The analysis is motivated by the recent surge of interest in markets as information aggregation devices and their potential use within firms. We characterize the amount of outcome manipulation that results in equilibrium and the impact of this manipulation on market prices. (JEL: D71, D82, D83, D84)

We characterize single-crossing preference profiles in terms of two forbidden substructures, one of which contains three voters and six (not necessarily distinct) alternatives, and one of which contains four voters and four (not necessarily distinct) alternatives. We also provide an efficient way to decide whether a preference profile is single-crossing. JEL Classification: D71, C78.

Committee decision making is examined in this study focusing on the role assigned to the committee members. In particular, we are concerned about the comparison between committee performance under specialization and non-specialization of the decision makers. JEL Classification number: D81, D71

We present a model of information aggregation in which agents’ information is represented through partitions over states of the world. We discuss three axioms, meet separability, upper unanimity, and non-imposition, and show that these three axioms characterize the class of oligarchic rules, which combine all of the information held by a pre-specified set of individuals. JEL classification: D70...

We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents’ preferences are additive, no such rule exists. JEL Classification: C71, D63, D71.

In this paper we show that every finite-player game in characteristic function form obeying an innocuous condition (that the set of individually rational pay-off vectors are bounded) possesses a farsighted von-Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. JEL Classification No.: C71, D71.

This chapter gives a flavour of recent theoretical work on coalition formation and political parties. I survey recent work on both pre-election coalition formation and post election coalition (or government) formation. A number of alternative rationales for the formation of parties are compared with the help of some illustrative examples. JEL Classification:C71, C72, C78, D71, D72, D78

Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on mergingand splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments. JEL classification: C71, D23, D71.

This paper uses an axiomatic approach to study the properties of voting procedures. We propose a new axiom, called “group support,” which requires that an alternative that is selected by a society must be selected by some subgroup of the society. We show that group support and faithfulness characterize a class of scoring rules that we call topheavy rules. JEL Classification: D71

This note adds one celebrated coalition formation game due to Gamson (1961) in the list of applications of the theory of hedonic games explored by Banerjee, Konishi and Somnez (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). We apply their results to study the original Gamson game and o er extensions both to a multi-dimensional characteristics space and to an in nite number of players. JEL Classi ca...