This paper examines the connection between the legal environment and financial development, and then traces this link through to long-run economic growth. Countries with legal and regulatory systems that (1) give a high priority to creditors receiving the full present value of their claims on corporations, (2) enforce contracts effectively, and (3) promote comprehensive and accurate financial r...

Drawing on qualitative fieldwork in China’s Guangdong and Zhejiang Provinces, the author asks how postsocialist unions respond to worker unrest and why the development of sectoral-level bargaining has been uneven in different regions of China. While Zhejiang has had relative success in establishing the organizational infrastructure for sectoral bargaining, Guangdong has had little success despi...

A large literature in empirical public finance relies on "bunching" to identify a behavioral response to non-linear incentives and to translate this response into an economic object to be used counterfactually. We conduct this type of analysis in the context of prescription drug insurance for the elderly in Medicare Part D, where a kink in the individual's budget set generates substantial bunch...

This introductory chapter to Economic Models of Law (forthcoming, Edward Elgar) discusses the use of economic models for understanding law. It also provides a survey of the contents of the volume, which consist of twenty-one previously published articles in the areas of torts, contracts, property, and legal process.

This paper proposes the view that financial development and economic growth are linked through the characteristics of technology. Perhaps the most obvious connection between technology and financial innovation emerges through risk-sharing. Technology is modeled as a distribution function over output values. While progress allows higher output values to be attained, it also changes the risk prof...

This paper evaluates the importance of “property rights institutions”, which protect citizens against expropriation by the government and powerful elites, and “contracting institutions”, which enable private contracts between citizens. We exploit exogenous variation in both types of institutions driven by colonial history, and document strong firststage relationships between property rights ins...