The neoliberal international order is facing a variety of pressing obstacles. One the most contentious issues emergence new Asian regionalism, which has been driven by rising economic power region and integration based on Association Southeast Nations (ASEAN) Plus Six framework. legalization ASEAN way propelled New Regional Economic Order (NREO), reinforces trade-development nexus alternative t...

BACKGROUND In principle, trade and investment agreements are meant to boost economic growth. However, the removal of trade barriers and the provision of investment incentives to attract foreign direct investments may facilitate increased trade in and/or more efficient production of commodities considered harmful to health such as tobacco. We analyze existing evidence on trade and investment lib...

The introduction of new (and expensive) pharmaceutical products is one of the major challenges for health systems. The search for new institutional arrangements is natural. The use of the so-called risk-sharing agreements is one example. Recent discussions have somewhat neglected the economic fundamentals underlying risk-sharing agreements. We argue here that risk-sharing agreements, although a...

Introduction: Over the past fifteen years, there has been a dramatic rise in the number and range of regional or preferential trade agreements (PTAs). 1 There is evidence to suggest that market driven regional trading blocs are emerging in the European neighbourhood, the Americas and East Asia. The US is actively pursuing FTA in the Americas and East and South-East Asia. The European Union (EU)...

We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which di¤erent agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for implementing agreements have. If agreements are implemented as they are reached, “easy” issues are negot...

We study equilibrium binding agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of all other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic function, explicit attention is paid...