Evolutionary game theory is used to model the evolution of competing strategies in a population of players. Evolutionary stability of a strategy is a dynamic equilibrium, in which any competing mutated strategy would be wiped out from a population. If a strategy is weak evolutionarily stable, the competing strategy may manage to survive within the network. Understanding the network-related fact...

Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals and species. The analysis of ESSs determines which, if any, combinations of behaviors cannot be invaded by alternative strategies. Two assumptions required to generate an ESS (i.e. an infinite population and payoffs described only on the average) do not hold under natural conditions. Previous experiment...

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economical behaviors. In this paper, we develop a new approach to evaluate ESS in symmetric two player games with fuzzy payoffs. Particularly, every strategy is assigned a fuzzy membership that describes to what degree it is an ESS in pre...

In 1974 J. Maynard Smith introduced the fundamental notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in order to explain the evolution of genetically determined social behaviour within a single animal species. If the possible pure strategies for contests within a species are 1,2, . . ., ~1, and if A = (aij) is the payoff matrix, then aij is the payoff for the pure strategy i played against the...

In recent iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments, the most successful strategies were those that had identification mechanisms. By playing a predetermined sequence of moves and learning from their opponents' responses, these strategies managed to identify their opponents. We believe that these identification mechanisms may be very useful in evolutionary games. In this paper one such strategy, ...

This paper studies both power and access control in solarpowered broadband wireless networks. Solar-powered batteries are modeled as stochastic process. Battery-state dependent interactions in all the system in which each user have to control its own battery state and energy consumption are analyzed using non-cooperative evolutionary games with several states and individual independent Markov p...

We examine the role played by crossover in a series of genetic algorithm-based evolutionary simulations of the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The simulations are characterized by extended periods of stability, during which evolutionarily meta-stable strategies remain more or less fixed in the population, interrupted by transient, unstable episodes triggered by the appearance of adaptively targete...

We present a very simple reduction that when given a graph G and an integer k produces a game that has an evolutionary stable strategy if and only if the maximum clique size of G is not exactly k. Formally this shows that existence of evolutionary stable strategies is hard for a complexity class called co − D, slightly strengthening (and greatly simplifying) the known NP-hardness and co-NP-hard...

Human language is still an embarrassment for evolutionary theory, as the speaker’s benefit remains unclear. The willingness to communicate information is shown here to be an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), even if acquiring original information from the environment involves significant cost and communicating it provides no material benefit to addressees. In this study, communication is used...