We consider a model in which a principal must both repay a loan and motivate an agent to work hard. Output is non-contractible, so the principal faces a commitment problem with both her creditor and her agent. In a profit-maximizing equilibrium, the agent’s productivity is initially low and increases over time. Productivity continues increasing even after the debt has been repaid, eventually co...

We analyze optimal financial contracts when the specificity of investments is endogenous. Specialization decreases the liquidation value of assets, but it also improves the project’s long term productivity. While the first effect is known to make financing more difficult, we show that the second effect can ease financing constraints and increase financing capacity by improving an entrepreneur’s...

We examine the intersection between corporate divestitures of tangible assets and investment in intangible capital (R&D) to provide new tests for the impact financing constraints have on real activity. A positive R&D sensitivity to asset sale proceeds indicates binding financing constraints since cash inflows from tangible asset sales are negatively correlated with productivity shocks and not o...

We develop a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous firms and we analyse how financing frictions affect export decisions and industry equilibrium. We show that, in the presence of costly bankruptcy, future expected financing frictions have a strong impact on current export decisions. We use this model to analyse firm dynamics in a sector that opens up to trade. We show that future expected f...

We study the effect of asset liquidity (“tangibility”) on firm policies in the presence of financing constraints. We do so in a real options framework that allows for the simultaneous determination of investment and financing. In the presence of financing imperfections, firms that operate more tangible assets have larger credit capacity. By expanding the firm’s capital base, the investment proc...