This paper compares the timeliness and accuracy of (confidential) government assessments of bank condition against market evaluations of large U.S. bank holding companies. We find that supervisors and bond rating agencies both acquire some information that would help the other group forecast changes in bank condition. In contrast, supervisory assessments and equity market indicators are not str...

A number of recent national and EU initiatives have sought explicitly to encourage innovative firms and venture capital finance. In keeping with the policy debate, this paper focuses explicitly on the role of law and lawyers in facilitating venture capital: that is, both supply by investors, and demand by entrepreneurs. It reviews existing literature in a way that seeks to clarify the links bet...

Increasingly, policymakers look to the small business sector as a potential engine of economic growth. Policies to promote small businesses include tax relief, direct subsidies, and indirect subsidies through government lending programs. Encouraging lending to small business is the primary policy objective of the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) loan-guarantee program. Using a panel data s...

We examine how local political corruption affects firm innovation in the United States. We find that firms located in more corrupt districts are less innovative, as measured by their patenting activities. We identify two possible economic channels through which corruption may affect innovation: a disincentive effect and a culture effect. We show that the negative impact of corruption on innovat...

We examine whether firms pursue target board structures. Using a broad panel from 1991–2003, we find that board changes are frequent, with two-thirds of firms changing board size or independence during a two-year period. Board changes are associated with changes in firm-specific fundamentals. The rate of change is positively associated with the benefits of effective boards and negatively associ...

We study the role of takeover threats as a corporate control mechanism using [Aghion, P., Tirole, J., 1997. Formal and real authority in organizations. Journal of Political Economy 105, 1–29] model of formal and real authority. Shareholders do not monitor the manager’s actions since ownership is widely dispersed. A corporate raider may monitor and step in if a profit opportunity exists. In our ...

We define annual shareholder meetings as contentious if one or more ballot items are likely to obtain sufficient shareholder votes to induce a firm to implement governance changes. Using a sample of almost 28,000 meetings between 2003 and 2012, we find that abnormal stock returns over the 40-day period prior to contentious meetings are significantly positive and higher than prior to non-content...

This paper investigates how and to what extent institutional development influences and permits firm-specific information to be incorporated into share prices, as measured by stock price synchronicity. Tracing the experience of China, an economy undergoing dramatic changes in the last 20 years with rich variation in experiences across provinces, this paper reveals that stock price synchronicity...

This paper uses a quasi-experimental framework provided by recent changes in Russian corporate law to study the effect of investor protection on the value of shares. The legal change analyzed involves the empowerment of preferred (non-voting) shareholders to veto unfavorable changes in their class rights. Based on a novel hand-collected dataset of dual class stock companies in Russia and using ...

We use the occasion of a change in tax policy that raised the tax rate for many of the listed companies in China to examine tax-induced earnings management (TEM) from the perspective of political connections. We find that when the tax rate increased, only those affected firms with politically connected management engaged in TEM. This suggests that, in addition to motivation for managing earning...