According to the standard definition, a Bayesian agent is one who forms his posterior belief by conditioning his prior belief on what he has learned, that is, on facts of which he has become certain. Here it is shown that Bayesianism can be described without assuming that the agent acquires any certain information; an agent is Bayesian if his prior, when conditioned on his posterior belief, agr...

Objective: to report a case of recurrent chronic subdural hematoma treated using endovascular superselective embolization the middle meningeal artery with SQUID-18 non-adhesive embolic agent. Materials and methods. A 73-year-old male patient had an open head injury after own height falling. Multislice computed tomography demonstrated in left parietooccipital region. The surgery positive effect;...

Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic for many applications. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which he is unaware without there being an explicit fact that the agent knows he is unaware of. We propose a logic for reasoning about knowledge of unawareness, b...

We proposed an extended car-following approach on evacuation system of micro traffic. It is based on the agent model. Parameter which is owned by the agent is the velocity. We added one driving behavior in the car-following a smart driver. Characteristics of smart driver he has a concern for the distance between his vehicle with the vehicle in front of him so that he will change the speed based...

John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is a book of tremendous scope, moving from foundational questions about reasons, requirements, and oughts to more general issues concerning the architecture of a rational agent and, especially, the process of reasoning through which such an agent could bring itself to satisfy the requirements of rationality. Although Broome explores a number of these ...

We consider a model in which each agent in a population chooses one of two options. Each agent does not know what the available options are and can choose an option only after observing another agent who has already chosen that option. In addition, the agents’ preferences over the two options are correlated. An agent can either imitate an observed agent or wait until he meets two agents who mad...

We identify previously unnoticed ways in which agents can strategically distort allocation rules, by affecting the set of “active” agents. (i) An agent withdraws with his endowment. (ii) He gives control of his endowment to someone else and withdraws. (iii) He invites someone in and let him use some of his endowment. (iv) He pre-delivers to some other agent the net trade that the rule would ass...

Before an outstanding article in 1999 by Richard Holton, weakness of will was identified as an agent's action contrary to his or her better judgment, while other better choices are available. The contemporary account of weakness of will (i.e., Holton’s theory) explains it in terms of intention. Accordingly, weakness of will happens if an agent fails to stick to his or her previously formed inte...